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The Market for User Data
Olivier Sylvain*
Policymakers are today far more alert than ever before to the
myriad ways in which tech companies collect and distribute
consumers’ data with third-party data brokers and advertisers. We
can attribute this new awareness to at least two major news stories
from the past six or so years. The first came in 2013, when Edward
Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, leaked
highly classified materials that revealed the ways in which United
States national security officials, with the indispensable cooperation
of U.S. telecommunications companies, systematically monitored
telephone conversations and electronic communications of U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals.1 The story triggered a series of
rebukes from civil rights groups, consumer advocates, and foreign
leaders around the world. It is not clear whether or the extent to
which the NSA or other government agencies have terminated those
programs since Snowden’s revelation.2
The second came in early 2018, when another whistleblower
revealed to journalists that researchers to whom Facebook had
allowed to collect and study dozens of millions of users’ personal
data, in turn, shared those troves of personal data with Cambridge
Analytica, a political consultancy firm.3 Cambridge Analytica had

*

Professor at Fordham University School of Law and Director of the McGannon Center
for Communications Research.
1
See Julia Angwin et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y.
TIMES, (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsaspy-on-an-array-of-internet-traffic.html [https://perma.cc/AXJ8-RZ6P].
2
Ryan Gallagher & Henrik Moltke, The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs
in Eight US Cities, The Intercept (June 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/attinternet-nsa-spy-hubs/ [https://perma.cc/VY6V-Y5UL].
3
Carole Cadwalladr, ‘I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool’: Meet the
Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018, 05:44 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopherwylie-faceook-nix-bannon-trump [https://perma.cc/MW6Q-YSV2].
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promoted their access to this data to peddle “psychographic
targeting” to political campaigns, including that of Donald Trump
in 2016.4 This more recent revelation has exposed Facebook to what
will likely be the largest fine imposed by the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) in history.5
These stories were about the extraordinary misuse and abuse of
consumer data by powerful tech companies. But they also are largescale demonstrations of the Private-Sector Ecosystem of User
Data—the theme of the fall 2018 symposium to which this volume
of the Fordham IPLJ is committed. At a minimum, these recent
episodes, along with others, have dramatically raised our collective
awareness about the ways in which consumer data has become the
lifeblood of the networked information environment.
Two decades ago, scholars and writers wondered whether online
tech companies would ever find a sustainable business model. It
appears, however, that, even at that time, some savvy entrepreneurs
were on to something. DoubleClick, which is now owned by
Alphabet, for example, had already developed techniques to track
users’ web browsing activity across their hundreds of affiliated
sites.6 There, of course, was nothing novel in the idea of an
advertising-based business model; advertising has defined the
political economy of the media and communications industry at
least since the nineteenth century. But, at the turn of the century, it
was not evident to anyone but just a relatively few scholars and
entrepreneurs in the start-up world that targeted behavioral
advertising would have purchase in the networked information
economy.7

4

Sue Halpern, Cambridge Analytica and the Perils of Psychographics, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cambridge-analytica-andthe-perils-of-psychographics [https://perma.cc/7AZG-KHDM].
5
Mike Isaac and Cecilia Kang, Facebook Expects to Be Fined Up to $5 Billion by
F.T.C. Over Privacy Issues, N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/04/24/technology/facebook-ftc-fine-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/2V9V-63AG].
6
See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
7
See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771 (1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving
Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315
(1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1994).
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Two decades later, companies have been refining the
advertising-based business model. They have been developing ever
more powerful algorithmic processes for harvesting, trading on, and
exploiting personal consumer data for advertisers.8 These
computational techniques have empowered firms to collect
extraordinary amounts of consumer data, anticipate consumer
preferences based on that data, and microtarget advertising to
individual users based on those predictions.9 It is all a marketer’s
dream. And, if click-through rates are to be believed, consumers are
sold.10
WHEN ALGORITHMS GO AWRY
But sometimes these algorithms make mistakes. While these
errors are often innocuous, they are occasionally tone-deaf, as when
Virginia Eubanks, who wrote a marvelous book about the ways in
which algorithmic decisionmaking processes can be disastrous for
the most vulnerable among us, received an advertisement for her
own book.11 Sometimes their mistakes are in very poor taste and
offensive, as when Facebook created an advertisement out of a
violently misogynistic Instagram post originally sent to a prominent
female tech reporter.12 Or when a social media algorithm distributed

8

See, e.g., TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE
OUR HEADS (2016).
9
See Zeynep Tufekci, How Recommendation Algorithms Run the World, WIRED (Apr.
22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-recommendation-algorithms-run-the-world/
[https://perma.cc/2ZFS-JFPD].
10
See Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, People Want Personalised Recommendations (Even as
They Worry about the Consequences), DIGITAL NEWS REPORT (2016),
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/essays/2016/people-want-personalisedrecommendations/ [https://perma.cc/3YP9-Q7NM].
11
See @PopTechWorks, TWITTER (May 14, 2010, 1:11 PM), https://twitter.com
/PopTechWorks/status/1128392383966654464 [https://perma.cc/A3VH-YQAF].
12
See Sam Levin, Instagram Uses ‘I Will Rape You’ Post as Facebook Ad in Latest
Algorithm Mishap, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2017/sep/21/instagram-death-threat-facebook-olivia-solon
[https://perma.cc/55EM-X227].
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an advertisement for gay conversion therapy to members of the
LGBTQ community.13
Sometimes companies purposefully design their advertisements
to target audiences in ways that, while lawful and rational, are
unseemly. For example, in 2012, Orbitz, the travel fare aggregator,
relied on consumer data to steer Mac users to pricier hotels on the
finding that such users spend 30% more on hotels than PC users.14
Price discrimination is not illegal, for the most part, but selective
marketing techniques like these consumers are hardly harmless to
those who are systematically chosen to pay more than others or, for
that matter, to those who are never exposed to fancier lodging. Much
more recently, we learned that Netflix tested advertising about
movies based on their various audiences’ race and gender by, for
example, emphasizing black characters to black audiences even
when those characters play minor roles.15
Every now and again, algorithmic microtargeting enables or
encourages violations of law. Just this past spring, for example,
Facebook agreed to settle a series of lawsuits that alleged that its Ad
Manager generated marketing classifications that made it possible
for advertisers to discriminate against people on the basis of
protected categories like race, gender, and age in violation of civil
rights laws.16 The social media company had harvested and analyzed
13

See Mary Elizabeth Williams, Facebook Removes Ads for Gay Conversion Therapy
After Backlash, SALON (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/08/31/facebookremoves-ads-for-gay-conversion-therapy-after-backlash/ [https://perma.cc/UN8S-G36C].
14
See Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST.
JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044586045
77488822667325882 [https://perma.cc/E6TT-8JXA].
15
See Lucas Shaw & Jordyn Holman, Netflix Denies Tailoring Its Movie Promotions
Based on Race (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-1022/netflix-denies-tailoring-movie-promotions-based-on-users-race
[https://perma.cc/38ZT-ZVJF].
16
See Katie Benner, Glenn Thrush & Mike Isaac Facebook Engages in Housing
Discrimination With Its Ad Practices, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/politics/facebook-housing-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/UA5C-FKX9]. In the settlement, Facebook did not admit legal
wrongdoing, but it nevertheless agreed, among other things, to discontinue its use of those
categories in markets for housing, employment, and credit. See id.; see also Olivier
Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, EMERGING THREATS SERIES, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Apr. 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data [https://perma.cc/8QD5-AF3P].
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its consumers’ data to generate the unlawful categories. It is
impossible that the vast majority of users wanted data about them to
be used in this way.
Microtargeting techniques present challenges as much as they
provide opportunities. So much of the algorithmic outputs depend
on the data on which their designers “train” them.17 If the algorithms
do not learn from their masters to be law-abiding, those algorithms
will of course break the law.
The same might be said about other classes of user information,
including biometric data which can, on the one hand, be inputs
through which algorithms might keep us safer and create new
efficiencies.18 (See, for example, fingerprinting on iPhones.) But, in
the wrong hands, biometric data also can enable discrimination
against classes of people.19 This is to say nothing of the variety of
ways in which the technology is easily susceptible to abuse by
governments and private actors. This is why facial recognition
technology may very well be too difficult to administer in
democracies with longstanding constitutional commitments to
procedural and substantive fairness.20

17

See generally AI Now, DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI
(Apr. 2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S93FGA4].
18
See Elizabeth Joh, Want to See My Genes? Get a Warrant, N.Y. Times (June 11,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html [https://
perma.cc/37AH-N6QR]; James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognitionpolice-new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/QM34-Y5E3].
19
See Joy Buolamwini, Artificial Intelligence Has a Problem with Gender and Racial
Bias. Here’s How to Solve It., TIME (Feb. 7, 2019), http://time.com/5520558/artificialintelligence-racial-gender-bias/ [https://perma.cc/C9UX-BGDT]; Steve Lohr, Facial
Recognition Is Accurate if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/4GAP-K5KH].
20
Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Amazon Needs to Stop Providing Facial
Recognition
Tech
for
the
Government,
MEDIUM
(Jun.
21,
2018),
https://medium.com/s/story/amazon-needs-to-stop-providing-facial-recognition-tech-forthe-government-795741a016a6 [https://perma.cc/RXL3-DPK3]. See also Kate Conger,
The Man Behind San Francisco’s Facial Recognition Ban Is Working on More. Way More.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/facialrecognition-san-francisco-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8KDW-ECWL].

1092

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1087

WHERE AND HOW DOES LAW COME IN?
In the past couple of years, in light of mounting public concern,
legislatures and regulators around the world have announced new
protections for consumers. To be sure, consumers have had legal
recourse since the nineteenth century.21 But, today, policymakers
have sought reforms in recognition of the massive scale and
distinctive nature of the private-sector ecosystem of consumer data.
The European Union has been at the forefront of this effort,
enacting the comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”).22 It has only been a year since that law has been in effect,
but we can already identify the important trends.23 Under the GDPR,
companies must give consumers (what the regulation calls “data
subjects”) access to the data that they have about them, and ensure
meaningful user consent to process that information.24 Consumers
also have the right to withdraw this consent “at any time,”25 as well
as the right to “rectification”26 and “erasure.”27 (These are concepts
that had been set out in the now defunct EU Data Protection
Directive and elaborated in the European Court of Justice’s preGDPR opinions.28) The GDPR provides, moreover, that companies
may not share a user’s data to third parties for any purposes that are
21

See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
22
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
23
See, e.g., Mathew J. Schwartz, GDPR: Europe Counts 65,000 Data Breach
Notifications So Far, GovInfo (May 16, 2019), https://www.govinfosecurity.com/gdpreurope-counts-65000-data-breach-notifications-so-far-a-12489#.XOKLGMyqUjo.twitter
[https://perma.cc/7JVM-NW4B]. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD,
First Overview on the Implementation of the GDPR and the Roles and Means of the
National Supervisor Authorities (Mar. 18, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb
/files/files/file1/19_2019_edpb_written_report_to_libe_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LQ2RWMW].
24
GDPR, Ch. 2, Art 7.
25
Id.
26
GDPR, Ch. 16.
27
GDPR, Ch. 17.
28
European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, (1995)
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“incompatible” with the ones for which that user shared their data to
begin with.29 The GDPR imposes significant fines for violations of
its terms.30 Questions remain about the new law’s extraterritorial
scope,31 but it nevertheless is a significant reform, at least because
U.S.-based companies that do business in Europe have been forced
to change their consumer data management practices.
Federal lawmakers in the United States have not mustered a
national consensus on anything that resembles the GDPR. Instead,
here, federal privacy law has been sectoral for decades, with statutes
addressing specific actors in delineated legislative fields through,
for example, the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Financial
Credit Reporting Act, and the Video Privacy Protection Act.
For the past several decades, the FTC has relied on its organic
statute to justify a wide range of enforcement actions and guidance
for industry’s administration of consumer data.32 It has exercised
this authority in fits and starts, largely because Congress
substantially curtailed the agency’s ability to promulgate “notice
and comment” rules in the area.33 In spite of the substantial hurdles
imposed by Congress in 197534 the agency proposed this past March
to fortify existing rules for the protection of “the privacy and
security of customer information held by financial institutions.”35 It
has also been in talks with Facebook following its investigation of

29

GDPR, Ch. 2, Art. 5.
GDPR, Ch. 8, Art. 83.
31
See, e.g., Joshua Blume, A Contextual Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and
DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1446-55 (2019); Daphne Keller,
The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data
Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 287, 348-51 (2018).
32
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
33
See Magnuson Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act § 202,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. 57a–58 (1975)).
34
Scholars have argued that Congress should increase the scope of the FTC’s authority.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
35
Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 13158 (proposed
Apr. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314).
30
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the Cambridge Analytica scandal.36 The size and nature of their
sanction against the social media giant will reveal how far the
agency is willing to go to vindicate its position as the primary federal
protector of consumer data.
State and city governments have stepped up in the absence of a
comprehensive federal data protection law. Illinois became a leader
among the states when, in 2008, its legislature passed the Biometric
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).37 As the title suggests, BIPA
imposes strict duties on the collection and storage of consumers’
biometric data. It requires, among other things, that companies
obtain consent from consumers to collect or disclose such
information, destroy that data after a certain period of time, and
securely store any information the company holds.38 California’s
Consumer Privacy Protection Act (“CCPA”), which becomes
effective in 2020, however, is probably the most sweeping state law
to date, adopting many of the same protections set out in the GDPR,
including the right of consumers to access the data that companies
have about them, the right of consumers to have that data deleted,
and the right to block the selling of the data.39 San Francisco, for its
part, is among the few local governments that have altogether
banned government agencies from employing facial recognition
technology.40 New York is considering a similar ban on the use of
facial recognition technology in public schools.41

36
Cecilia Kang, Facebook Set to Create Privacy Positions as Part of F.T.C. Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/technology/facebookftc-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/EX94-HQEJ].
37
Eileen King Bower, Theresa Le & James J. Moffitt, Illinois Leads the Way for
Biometric Privacy Legislation, LEXOLOGY: CLYDE & CO LLP BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b3538a7e-e33b-49fd-b523a9608d12811f [https://perma.cc/P5NK-KJS3].
38
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
39
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.175.
40
Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial
Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05
/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/K2KC-TZ3H].
41
See N.Y. Legis. Assemb. A-06787. Reg. Sess. 2019–2020 (2019); see also Davey
Alba, The First Public Schools in the US Will Start Using Facial Recognition Next Week,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(May
29,
2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article
/daveyalba/lockport-schools-facial-recognition-pilot-aegis
[https://perma.cc/LC36ZG3C].
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Legislators and government regulators have not been the only
reformers. The courts have played an important role in delineating
the extent to which private companies today may share consumer
data with government officials. Consider the Supreme Court’s 2018
opinion in Carpenter v. United States.42 There, the Court held that
law enforcement officials may only request and obtain subscribers’
historical mobile phone location data from telecommunications
companies on a showing of probable cause.43
Generally, under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement
officials must have probable cause to search “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.”44 But, under the third-party doctrine, the
Supreme Court has held that this probable cause standard does not
apply to law enforcement requests for business records about
consumer activity from banks and telecommunications providers.45
The logic for this rule is relatively straightforward: the records that
banks and telephone companies generate and collect about their
consumers are an indispensable incident of the services they
provide. Consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in those business records, the Court has explained, because they
voluntarily give their data to banks and telephone companies in
order to enjoy the services provided.46
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court decided not to extend the thirdparty doctrine to historical mobile phone location data. In the
aggregate, it explained, location information reveals an
unprecedented amount about subscribers that far exceeds the kinds
of information that justified the third-party doctrine.47 The Court did
not do away with the doctrine. It only refused to extend it to mobile
phone location, suggesting that the rule might be applied to other
networked mobile technologies as well.48

42

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2221.
44
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (noncontent telephone records); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records).
46
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–744; Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
47
138 S.Ct. at 2220.
48
Id. The Court considered whether the collection of location information for seven or
more days required a warrant. It did not answer whether its decision would extend to
43
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THE PRIVATE-SECTOR ECOSYSTEM OF USER DATA TODAY
The GDPR, BIPA, the CCPA, and the Carpenter decision are
good indications that policymakers and courts today are adapting
current laws to meet the challenges posed by today’s networked
information economy. Longstanding consumer protection norms
like due process49 and “notice and consent,” for example, will
continue to play a role, although there is growing evidence that the
latter in particular is not especially protective of users.50 The
question policymakers will have to answer is: what should count as
consent, when so much remains unknown to consumers and
regulators?51 In this vein, scholars have made the case for regulatory
conventions like transparency and mandated impact assessments.52
At least for now, these concerns—transparency and
accountability—seem to be mobilizing voters and legislators.53 We
might suppose that, no matter how we come out of this important
constitutive moment, policymakers ought to foster trust between
consumers and the commercial entities that hold and manage their
personal data.54 But this is hardly an inevitable or necessarily
optimal way of conceiving of data protection in light of the seductive
commercial incentives to trade on access to consumer data.55
requests for fewer than seven days. Id. at 2217, n.3 (Roberts, J., majority), 2234 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
49
See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249
(2007).
50
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019).
51
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
52
See, e.g., Andrew Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GEORGIA L. REV.
109 (2017).
53
See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, The Legislation That Targets the
Racist Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07
/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/FL9Q-ZPX5]; Adi Robertson, A
New Bill Would Force Companies to Check Their Algorithms for Bias, VERGE (Apr. 10,
2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/18304960/congress-algorithmicaccountability-act-wyden-clarke-booker-bill-introduced-house-senate
[https://perma.cc/DW5D-ZLKX].
54
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183 (2016). See also ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY
FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018).
55
See Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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Anyway, for consumers and data protection policymakers, the
stakes seem especially high today because we are only now
beginning to really comprehend the scale and pervasive integration
of the market for user data. Techniques for the collection and
distribution of user data define practically all of our experiences
today—online and offline. It is not really until consumers and
policymakers have a far better understanding of this scope that many
of us can rest easy. The Fordham IPLJ symposium is one step in
that direction.

